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Kolmogorov Complexity and Information Content
Fouad B. Chedid∗
Abstract
In this paper, we revisit a central concept in Kolmogorov complex-
ity in which one would equate program-size complexity with information
content. Despite the fact that Kolmogorov complexity has been widely
accepted as an objective measure of the information content of a string,
it has been the subject of many criticisms including the fundamental one
directed by logicians and philosophers towards the statistical and seman-
tical theories of information, which is about confusing an object and its
name. In this paper, we clarify a number of subtle issues that are at the
center of this debate.
1 Introduction
In his seminal paper (Kolmogorov 1965), Kolmogorov introduced an algorithmic
approach to quantitatively define information using the theory of algorithms.
In particular, the Kolmogorov complexity of a finite binary string x is defined
as the length of a shortest binary program p, which when interpreted by some
Universal Turing Machine M , causes that machine to output x and then halt.
Formally put,
KM (x) = min .p{|p| : M(p) = x}
=∞, if there is no p such that M(p) = x.
So, one can view KM (x) as the size of an ultimate, most compressed, code p
for x using a universal Turing machine as a decompressor. Unfortunately, the
compressor that generates p is not known. This is true because of the Halting
problem (Turing 1936). That is, there is no effective procedure for determining
the size of a smallest program for x. Of course, we can always estimate KM (x)
from above by discovering shorter and shorter programs for x, but we can never
be certain that our best discovered short program for x is a shortest one.
In that same paper (Kolmogorov 1965), Kolmogorov used the expression
”the information content of a message”, and then he went on to define I(x : y)
as ”the quantity of information conveyed by an individual object x about an
individual object y”, and concluded that the information conveyed by x about
itself, I(x : x), is equal to KM (x).
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We mention that prior to this work of Kolmogorov, the notion of the infor-
mation content of a string wasn’t there. For example, Shannon’s work (Shannon
1948) was about the minimum number of bits needed on the average to trans-
mit a value taken by a random variable, as a syntactic unit independent of any
semantic (Shannon wrote “ ... semantic aspects of communication are irrelevant
to the engineering problem ..”). Similarly, Chaitin was interested in studying
the size of a shortest binary program capable of generating a given sequence
of bits on a universal Turing machine (Chaitin 1966), and Solomonoff was in-
terested in predicting the next value taken by a random variable following an
unknown probability distribution (Solomonoff 1964).
The following definition of a possible information measure was first sug-
gested by Wiener: “The amount of information provided by a single message
mi, I(mi) = − log2 pi” (Wiener 1948), which is related to the number of bits
needed to identify any of the messages which happen to occur with probability
pi. Still, we should be clear that neither Wiener nor Kolmogorov has made the
shift from the sense of treating information as a sequence of bits to the sense
where information is about what is expressed by that sequence of bits, which
was the main drive behind what has become known as the semantic theory of
information (Popper 1934, Bar-Hillel 1952, Carnap 1964). The comforting thing
is that both statistical (= Shannonian) and semantical theories of information
agree that information is about removal of uncertainty. This agrees with the
point of view suggested by Kolmogorov, though seen from an opposite end, that
information is about uncompressed regularities. That is, the more compressible
a string is, the less information it contains, and vice versa. For a wealth of in-
formation on Kolmogorov complexity and its applications, the reader is referred
to Cover and Thomas 2006 and Li and Vita´nyi 2008.
Despite the fact that Kolmogorov complexity has been widely accepted as
an objective measure of the information content of a string, the concept of
equating program-size complexity with information content continues to be chal-
lenged using several arguments (See for e.g., Grassberger 1990, Li 1991, Gell-
Mann and Lloyd 2003) including the fundamental criticism directed by logicians
and philosophers towards the statistical and semantical theories of information
(Raatikainen 1998), which is about confusing an object and its name, or equiv-
alently confusing the object language and the metalanguage. We show that
understanding Kolmogorov’s notions of randomness in the positive versus nega-
tive sense is at the center of this debate. We also explain the works of Shannon,
Solomonoff, and Kolmogorov using the language of analytic philosophy. We
clarify that both Shannon’s entropy and Solomonoff’s universal probability use
their arguments and that Kolmogorov complexity mentions its argument, which
explains the suitability of Kolmogorov complexity as a measure of the informa-
tion content of an individual string.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives the necessary
background about related theories. We discuss the notions of Shannon’s entropy,
Solomonoff’s universal probability, and Kolmogorov’s algorithmic description.
Section 3 contains our contribution.
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2 Background
Shannon’s information theory is about the most economical way of transmitting
a message between a sender and a receiver over a binary communciation channel.
For simplicity, we assume that messages are the outputs of a discrete random
variable X that can take its values from a finite alphabet X = {x1, . . . , xn}
using a probability distribution P = {p1, . . . , pn}. That is, Prob.{X = xi} =
pi, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n. We also say that X is distributed according to P (x).
We mention that the Shannon-Fano code (Shannon 1948, Fano 1949) is the
most fundamental result in determining the descriptive complexity of an object
in both probabilistic (Shannon’s) and algorithmic (Kolmogorov’s) settings. It is
a simple observation which states that if an event has a probability of occurrence
p, then the number of possible outcomes of that event is 1
p
, and the smallest
number of bits needed to represent any of those outcomes is ⌈log 1
p
⌉. Then, it is
a straighforward result that the expected value of the smallest number of bits
needed to represent any of the outcomes of the random variable X is
∑
xi∈X
pi⌈log
1
p i
⌉.
Shannon had wanted to call this quantity the “uncertainty” or “unexpectedness”
of the random variable, but then he went along with a suggestion from John von
Neumann and calledl it “entropy”1 (Wicken 1987). The entropy of a random
variable X drawn according to a mass probability function p is often denoted by
H(X) or H(p). The idea is that when a receiver learns about some output value
xi, then by doing so, she eliminates 2
H(X) possible outcomes on the average,
which is a measure of the average unexpectedness or uncertainty stored in X .
Furthermore, if we accept the notion that removal of uncertainty constitutes
information gain, then the entropy of the random variable becomes a measure
of the average amount of information stored in X .
In the Shannon’s theory of information, one of the main issues was to find
the length of a shortest description, on the average, of a string of symbols given
those symbols’ probabilities of occurrence. We now know that the solution to
this specific issue is the entropy of the probabitliy distribution p of the symbols
given by H(p) = −
∑
x px log px. Thus, the entire theory of Shannon rests on
the assumption that the probability distribution of the information source is
made available to us in advance.
We next ask what happens if we don’t know the probability distribution
of the information source? This is the same question that Solomonoff asked
himself in the early 1960s, although his intention was to develop a formal theory
of inductive inference. Investing in the main idea of Wiener and Shannon on
the relationship between the length lx of an optimal code for a symbol x and
the probability of occurence px of x; that is, lx = − log px, or equivalently, px =
1In thermodynamics, if we let n be the number of ways in which a physical sysem S can be
configured, then the quantity defined by logn is a measure of uncertainty or disorganization
in S, also called entropy of S.
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2−lx , Solomonoff combined (i) the simple idea that whatever binary encoding
the sender develops for x, it is something that the receiver must be able to
decode in order to recover x and (ii) the widely accepted Church’s thesis about
the Turing Machine as being the most general model capturing the notion of
effective computation to propose that whatever encoding ex of length lx the
sender decides to use to encode x, the receiver (Turing machine) should be
able to recover x from ex. In particular, if we let M be a fixed Universal Turing
Machine, then we wantM(ex) = x. In this sense, ex acts as a program that when
interpreted by M causes M to generate x and then halt. Moreover, we already
know that there is a relationship between lx and the probability distribution
generating x as assumed by the sender, namely px = 2
−lx . Putting all these
ideas together, Solomonoff proposed to model the true probability distribution
of x, whatever that may be, by his notion of Universal Probability2 defined as
P (x) =
∑
p:M(p)=x
2−|p|
which is basically the probability that a random string will print out x. An
additional requirement is needed here for P (x) to be a true probability. P (x) ≤ 1
if and only if all programs p such that M(p) = x form a prefix-free set3. This
follows from Kraft Inequality (Shannon 1948, Kraft 1949).
Around the same time in the early 1960s, Kolmogorov developed similar
ideas to Solomonoff’s, although for the purpose of studying the algorithmic
complexity of randomness. To motivate this discussion, let us first consider an
experiment in which we flip a fair coin 30 times and write down 1 if the coin
shows Head and 0 if it shows Tail. Let x1 and x2 be the outputs of two runs of
this experiment.
x1 : 101010101010101010101010101010
x2 : 110001010110100010111011101010
We next ask which of these two strings is the more random? Although x1 and
x2 have the same probabilities of occurrence (= 2
−30), it is obvious that these
two strings have different levels of randomness with x2 being the more random.
This is true because while x1 consists of 15 repetitions of the pattern“10”, there
doesn’t seem to be an obvious way to generate x2 than by rewriting x2 in its
entirety, and so, we would like to conclude that x2 is more random than x1.
As a matter of fact, Laplace (1749-1827) explained this a long time ago by
considering the set S of all binary strings of length 30, and by showing that
among all elements of S, the size of the subset S1 ⊂ S of which x1 is a typical
element is much smaller than the size of the subset S2 ⊂ S of which x2 is a
2Taking all programs for x into account follows Epicurus’ approach, while limiting our
attention to the shortest program for x follows Occam’s razor.
3Prefix-freeness means that if M(p) = x, then there is no other prefix q of p (q 6= p) that
can cause M to print x and then halts.
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typical element, and hence, the probability of the event S1 is smaller than that
of S2, which explains why x1 is less random than x2.
Kolmogorov, similar to Solomonoff, used the widely accepted Church’s thesis
about Turing machines to propose an algorithmic description of a binary string
x as the length of a shortest program x∗ for x on a universal Turing machine.
In particular, if we let M be a fixed Universal Turing Machine, then we want
M(x∗) = x. In this sense,M acts as a decompressor of an ultimately compressed
program (encoding) for x. Kolmogorov called the length of x∗ the descriptive
complexity of x (also known as Kolmogorov complexity) to be denoted by
KM (x) = |x
∗|
or equivalently,
KM (x) = minp{|p| : M(p) = x}.
We note that the Kolmogorov Complexity of a string is defined up to an addtive
constant. This is true because on one hand, KM (x) is defined relative to a
fixed Universal Turing Machine and on another hand we have the Invariance
Theorem, which states that given two fixed universal Turing machines M1 and
M2, |KM1(x) − KM2(x)| ≤ c, for some positive constant c which depends on
M1 and M2, but not on x. This is why it is fair to say that (up to an additive
constant) the Kolmogorov Complexity of a string is an intrinsic property of x
itself and is independent of the fixed universal Turing machine used to generate
it. Hereafter, we drop the reference to any fixed universal Turing machine and
write K(x) for the Kolmogorov Complexity of x.
Knowing that there is a relationship between the length of an encoding for
x and the probability of occurence of x, we have
Prob.(x) =
∑
x∗
2|K(x)|.
An additional technical requirement is needed here for Prob.(x) to be a true
probability. Prob.(x) ≤ 1 if and only if all shortest programs x∗ for x form a
prefix-free set4.
Comparing the expression of Prob.(x) to Solomonoff’s universal probability
shows that Kolmogorov’s work supports the principle of Occam’s razor5 while
Solomonoff’s work supports the principle of Epicurus6. Solomonoff believed it is
important to consider other programs (other than a shortest one) for x because
by not doing so, we would be missing on some information that could be helpful
for our understanding of the true distribution of x (Personal communication
2008).
4This is obviously true because otherwise there would be some shortest program that is
shorter than another shortest program, which is a contradiction.
5William of Ockham (1287-1347): If a phenomenon can be explained using several theories,
then it is best to adopt the simplest (shortest?) one.
6Epicurus (341-270 BC): If a phenomenon can be explained using several theories, then it
is important to keep all of them.
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Kolmogorov writes “In practice, we are most interested in the quantity of
information conveyed by an individual object x about an individual object y”
(Kolmogorov 1965). The conditional (relative) Kolmogorov complexity of a
string x when another string y is given is
K(x/y) = min.p{|p| : M(y, p) = x}
Here, we follow Kolmogorov’s notation and place the auxilliary information y
before p. Kolmogorov argued that since K(x/y) ≤ K(x), it is fair to call the
differene K(x) − K(x/y) the amount of information in y about x, and so, he
defined
I(y : x) = K(x)−K(x/y)
as the amount of information in y about x. If we next compute I(x : x), we
have K(x/x) = min.p{|p| : M(x, p) = x} = O(1), where the O(1) term is the
length of the copy program p that copies its input to its output. Thus, up to
an additive constant, K(x/x) = 0 and I(x : x) = K(x). Thus, Kolmogorov
suggested to call K(x) the amount of information in x about itself7.
In the next section, we show that understanding Kolmogorov’s notions of
randomness in the positive versus negative sense is at the center of this debate.
We also explain the works of Shannon, Solomonoff, and Kolmogorov using the
language of analytic philosophy. We clarify that both Shannon’s entropy and
Solomonoff’s universal probability use their arguments and that Kolmogorov
complexity mentions its argument, which explains the suitability of Kolmogorov
complexity as a measure of the amount of information in an individual string.
3 Criticisms and Clarifications
3.1 Equating Program-Size Complexity With Information
Content
According to Kolmogorov complexity, the information content of a string is
solely determined by the size of a shortest program capable of generating that
string on a Universal Turing Machine. Equating program-size complexity with
information content implies that strings that admit short descriptions (or equiv-
alently, that can be significantly compressed) have low complexity (little infor-
mation) and strings that resist short descriptions have high complexity (lots of
information). This equality is an ingenious idea that, while supported by many,
has been the subject of many criticisms. To motivate this discussion, consider,
for example, the case of two strings x and y of 1000 characters each, where x is
a passage from Tolstoy’s masterpiece War and Peace and y is a string of 1000
characters chosen at random. Using Kolmogorov complexity as a measure of
information content, we conclude that x has less information than y. This is
true because it is always possible to encode the string x by abbreviating some
7We could as well call it self-information, similar to the notion of self-entropy in Shannon’s
information theory.
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sentences in it to be recovered by the reader (say we use “btw” for “by the way”,
etc.). However, the only way to generate y is to copy it in its entirety. This
absurdity is a main argument used against using program-size complexity as a
measure of information content. For example, the German physicist Grassberger
writes “Kolmogorov complexity seems to be the quantity most closely related
to the intutive notion of randomness, not of complexity” (Grassberger 1986).
Grassberger suggested using the word “randomness” for the property measured
by Kolmogorov complexity and reserving the word “complexity” for something
that is between total regularity and total randomness (Grassberger 1990). Thus,
according to Grassberger, strings of total regularity (those that can be signif-
icanlty compressed) or total randomness (those that can’t be compressed at
all) have small complexity. In either case, the string can be generated by a
simple procedure. Here, simplicity is not related to the size of the procedure,
but rather to the process involved in the generation of the string. Similarly,
the American physicist Gell-Mann supported the unsuitability of the quantity
measured by Kolmogorov compelxity as a measure of complexity (Gell-Mann
2003). Furthermore, Gell-Mann defined the Effective Complexity of an object
as the length of a highly compressed description of that objects’ regularities
(Gell-Mann 1996). Another interesting view was proposed in (Li 1991), from
which we quote the following text:
It has been pointed out repeatedly that algorithmic complexity does
not fit our intuitive notion of complexity. One vague argument is
that algorithmic complexity measures the difficulty of the task – to
reconstruct a sequence exactly – that is not very “meaningful.” To
say that this task is not very meaningful is partly based on our daily
experience that we can pick up the main feature of a picture or the
basic meaning of a text by quickly scanning it without paying atten-
tion to every detail. A similar argument for algorithmic complexity
not being a “good” measure of compelxity is that the effort put in
to generate a sequence to be exactly correct does not contribute to
the “important features” of that sequence. Rather, they contribute
too much to the “trivial” details.
We now return to Kolmogorov and recall some of his work from 1974. Kol-
mogorov (though he never published anything on this himself) proposed a struc-
ture function hx() (Cover 1985) as a way to divide a shortest program x
∗ for
a finite binary string x into two parts responsible for encoding the regular and
nonregular (random) aspects of x separately. Of course, both parts are maxi-
mally random, and hence it is not clear how such a division can be made. Still,
the clever idea is that while we agree that the length of a shortest program x∗
for x is a measure of the amount of information (let’s call it total information)
in x, we would like to know more about the constituents of x∗. In particular,
we would like to know how much of x∗ is responsible for coding the regular
aspects of x (to be associated with meaningful information in x) and how much
is responsible for coding the random aspects of x (to be associated with acci-
dental information in x). Kolmogorov suggested to model the regular aspects of
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x by a finite set S of which x is a typical element. The notion of Kolmogorov’s
minimal sufficent statistic as the length of an optimally compressed descrip-
tion of the regular aspects of a string in the model class of finite sets was then
coined. A string x for which its minimal sufficient statistic is about the length
of x was called absolutely nonrandom (nonstochastic) by Kolmogorov. Thus, an
absolutely nonrandom string contains almost no random information. In other
words, almost all regularities in a nonrandom string are incompressible. Kol-
mogorov called such objects random in the negative sense. Interestingly (and
this can be a source of confusion), the incompressibility property of absolutely
nonrandom objects is shared with Kolmogorov random objects, which are in-
compressible because they contain few regularities. Kolmogorov called these
objects random in the positive sense. We now know that absolutely nonran-
dom objects exist (See lemma by Ga´cs in (Ga´cs et al. 2001), which was first
proved by Levin in 1973 (unpublished)). In 2006, Vita´nyi developed the theory
of recursive function statistic and explained the importance of using a total re-
cursive function to model the regular aspects of an object if we are to be able
to identify absolutely nonrandom objects (Vita´nyi 2006). This is true because
in the model class of partial recursive functions, all objects have low minimal
sufficient statistic, the main reason being that the complexity of the model part
can always be shifted to the data-to-model part of a universal Turing machine
of constant complexity.
We conclude this section by making the following three observations, which
should clarify a lot of confusion as to how the literature on Kolmogorov com-
plexity ought to be read and understood.
• It has been common in the Kolmogorov complexity literature to talk about
the Kolmogorov complexity of an object on the assumption that there is a
one-to-one mapping between objects x and binary specifications spec(x).
Unfortunately, the literature doesn’t distinguish explicitly between a bi-
nary specification and the object it specifies, and this has been a source of
confusion for many. If we are to be more explicit, we shouldn’t be talking
about the Kolmogorov complexity of an object x, but about the com-
plexity of the binary encoding, spec(x), of a specification of x, and write
K(spec(x)) = min.p{|p| : U(p) = spec(x)}, where U is a fixed reference
universal Turing machine. By the same token, when the literature talks
about the information content of an object, it is the information content
of the binary encoding of a specification of that object that should be
inferred.
• The Kolmogorov complexity of a finite string x is an objective measure of
the amount of information in x, which includes information about both
regular and random parts in x. What one would usually mean by the
word “information” in ordinary language is really about the amount of
information in the regular parts of x, which is captured by Kolmogorov al-
gorithmic sufficent statistic, Gell-Mann’s effective complexity, or Vita´nyi’s
meaningful information. Thus, if we consider a 2-part description (p, d)
of a shortest program x∗ for x, where p and d describe the regular and
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random parts in x∗, respectively, then the amount of meaningful infor-
mation in x is about the size of p, and not the size of x∗. Returning to
our example at the beginning of this section about the two 1000-character
strings x and y, where x is a passage from the book War and Piece and y
is a sequence of randomly generated characters, let the 2-part descriptions
of the shortest progams for x and y be (px∗ , dx∗) and (py∗ , dy∗), respec-
tively. It is true that K(y) > K(x), but it is also true that K(x) ≈ |px∗ |
and K(y) ≈ |dy∗ |. In other words, most of the information content of
x is about the regular parts in x, while most of the information content
of y is about the random parts in y. This explains why x contains more
meaningful information than y.
• Kolmogorov distinguished between two types of random strings. Those
that are random in the positive sense and those random in the negative
sense. While both types of random strings have maximal Kolmogorov
complexity, only random strings in the negative sense are complex and
have maximal (meaningful) information content. On the other hand, ran-
dom strings in the positive sense are not complex at all and have little or
no information content. An example of a random object in the negative
sense would be the United States tax code since it contains many rules and
each rule is a regularity. An example of a random object in the positive
sense would be a string of 1000 characters selected at random.
3.2 Confusing an Object and Its Name
The use-mention distinction in analytic philosophy is about confusing an object
and its name. We shall make this distinction clear using the following, rather
peculiar, example:
Steve has five letters.
If this sentence is telling us that the word Steve consists of 5 letters, then we
say that this sentence mentions the word Steve. In here, the word Steve refers
to its own text. However, if this sentence is telling us that a man named Steve
has received 5 letters in the mail, then we say that this sentence uses the word
Steve. In here, the word Steve refers to a specific person. Thus, mentioning
an object refers to the name of the object, while using an object refers to the
object itself.
We note that confusing an object and its name is a classical philosophical
fallacy (Raatikainen 1998). This is because determining the truth value of a
sentence depends very much on whether a sentence uses or mentions something.
For example, in the above example, the mention of Steve is a true statement
because there are indeed 5 letters in the word Steve. However, the truth value of
the use of Steve in the above sentence is not clear at all. It depends on whether
Steve has actually received 5 letters in the mail or not. Things can get even
more complicated when a sentence is self-referential, which could lead to what is
known as the semantic paradox. For example, consider the following statement:
9
This statement is false.
The use of the word This in the above statement could be either true or false,
depending on the truth value of the thing This refers to. However, the mention
of the word This gives a contradiction. This is true because if the statement
“This statement is false” is true, then it cannot be true because it says about
itself that it is false. Similarily, if the statement “This statement is false” is
false, then it must be true. In either case, we get a contradiction.
Using the language of analytic philosophy, we can say that both Shannon’s
entropyH(X) and Solomonoff’s universal probability P (x) use their arguments.
This is true because both H(X) and P (x) report information about the source
probability distributions of their arguments. Thus, the values of H(X) and
P (x) are useful only in so far as they describe the true probability distributions
of the information sources of their arguments.
Returning to Kolmogorov complexity, we say that K(x) mentions x. This is
because K(x) reports the length of a shortest program capable of generating x
on a Universal Turing machine, which is an intrinsic property of x. Thus, while
both H(X) and P (x) refer to information sources, K(x) refers to the name x.
This explains why Kolmogorov complexity is a suitable objective measure for
the amount of information stored in the individual string x.
Furthermore, it is known that Shannon’s entropy H(X) and Solomonoff’s
universal probability P (x) are closely related to Kolmogorov complexity K(x)
(Cover 2006). In particular, we know that
K(x) ≈ − logP (x)
and
H(X) ≈ The expected value of K(x)
With this in mind, it is only fair that all three measures be accepted as objective
measures for the amount of information in an individual string.
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